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LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENTS: ASSESSING
CLASSROOM PLACEMENT OF STUDENTS WITH
DISABILITIES UNDER THE IDEA
Sarah E. Farley, M.Ed.
Abstract: The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires school districts
to educate all students receiving special education in the "least restrictive environmenf'
appropriate for each student's needs. This provision reflects Congress' preference that
children with disabilities be educated alongside their non-disabled peers to the maximum
extent possible. The U.S. Supreme Court has never determined how to test whether a school
district has complied with this provision, so the federal circuits have developed several
different tests. However, these circuit tests all arose prior to the most recent 1997
Amendments to the IDEA. This Comment explores the development and subsequent
application of those tests, and argues that the Supreme Court should resolve this circuit split
by adopting a single national test. This Comment then proposes a new analysis that
synthesizes the best elements of the current tests and reflects the intent behind the 1997
Amendments.

Kevin is a high-school student with Down syndrome who just moved
to a school in Maryland! Ie has developmental delays and difficulty
with some academic subjects; however, he is not disruptive in class.
Kevin holds an after-school job and participates in social activities with
his friends. Nevertheless, if Kevin's new school were to place him in a
segregated vocational setting, federal courts in Kevin's state would likely
uphold the segregated placement.
Across the country in Oregon, Rina is an eight-year-old girl with
autism whose academic and communication skills are significantly
delayed. 2 Like Kevin, Rina has many friends, behaves well in class, and
is motivated to learn. If Rina were placed in a segregated special
education classroom, and if her parents objected, a federal court in
Rina's state would likely rule against her school, and required placement
in an integrated classroom.
The disparate outcomes for these two similar students illustrate the
problems that can arise when courts across the country assess a school
district's compliance the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA).3 The IDEA requires school districts to educate special education

1. Hypothetical based on DeVries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1989).
2. Hypothetical based on Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir.
1994).
3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (1997).
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students in the "least restrictive [appropriate] environment"' in order to
receive federal funding. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has not
provided guidance on how to determine whether a student is receiving
services in the least restrictive environment.6 The federal circuit courts
have filled that void by creating differing tests by which to measure
school district compliance with the least restrictive environment
provision (LRE provision).
Part I of this Comment introduces the IDEA and discusses the text,
history, purpose and structure of the LRE provision, as well as the
Department of Education's implementing regulations. Part II traces the
historical development and subsequent application of the federal circuit
tests for assessing whether school districts are complying with the LRE
provision. Part III argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should adopt a
uniform test. Part I also suggests a test that incorporates the best
aspects of the four circuit tests and reflects the new vision of the 1997
Amendments to the IDEA.
I.

THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT

The 1997 Amendments to the IDEA created the most recent version of
a law that has changed many times since its inception.7 For most of the
nation's history, students with disabilities were excluded from public
schools and segregated from other children.8 On the wave of the civil
rights movements of the 1960s, courts and Congress finally addressed
the segregation of students with disabilities. 9 Since the first education
laws passed in the 1960s, the IDEA has endured many revisions" and
continues to change as Congress better understands how to serve students
with disabilities."

4. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
5. Id. §§ 1411; 1412(a) (providing that states may be eligible for financial assistance under IDEA
if they meet the conditions listed in 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1)-(22) (1997)).
6. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari on two leading cases on this issue. Sacramento City
Unified Sch. Dist., 14 F.3d 1398, cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207 (1994); Roncker v. Walters, 700 F.2d
1058 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,464 U.S. 864 (1983).
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. Daniel H. Melvin II, Comment, The Desegregationof Children with Disabilities,44 DEPAUL
L. REV. 599, 603-04 (1995).
9. See infra Part I.A.
10. See infra Part I.B.
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (c)(5) (1997).

810
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A.

Early Developments in the Recognition of Civil Rights for Students
with Disabilities

As recently as the 1970s, students with disabilities were routinely
denied educational opportunities.12 The National Council on Disability
reports that:
[before the 1970s,] schools in America educated only one in five
students with disabilities. More than 1 million students were
excluded from public schools, and another 3.5 million did not
receive appropriate services. [Laws excluded] certain students,
including those who were blind, deaf, or labeled "emotionally
disturbed" or "mentally retarded." Almost 200,000 school-age
children with mental
retardation or emotional disabilities were
13
institutionalized.
Poor, rural, and minority students with disabilities had an even greater
chance of being institutionalized.14
The first major legislative reform to address these inadequacies came
in 1965 when Congress enacted the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (ESEA)5 to provide federal funds to improve education
for children with disabilities and other disadvantages. 6 The Education of
the Handicapped Act (EHA) in 1970 also dramatically increased federal
funding for special education. 7 However, these reforms were not
sufficiently comprehensive to meet the needs of many disabled
students."
Following the path forged by Brown v. Board of Education," in which
the U.S. Supreme Court found racially segregated schools to be
12. JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WNITH
DISABILmES FORGING A NE-W CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEimNT 167, 165-66 (Random House 1994).
13. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BACK TO SCHOOL ON CIVIL RIGHTS: ADVANCING THE

FEDERAL CoITrMENT TO LEAVE NO CHILD Bmm 6 (2000).
14. Id. Minority students continue to be disproportionately placed in special education. See 20
U.S.C. § 1400(c)(8)(A)-(D) (1997).
15. Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Pub. L No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965), amended by
Title VI, Pub. L No. 89-750, 161, 80 Stat. 1204 (1966).
16. Id.
17. Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L No. 91-230, 601-62, 84 Stat. 175, 175-88,
amended by Title VI, Pub. L No. 93-380, 611-21, 88 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1485 (1988 and Supp. V. 1993)).
18. SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 165-66 (explaining that even after the early reforms of the ESA
and the EHA, children with severe disabilities were still routinely excluded from public schools).
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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unconstitutional,'0 parents of disabled children began to take their
grievances to court. Two landmark cases in the early 1970s established
that children with disabilities have a constitutional right to be equally
included in public schools. 2' In Pennsylvania Associationfor Retarded
Children (P.A.R.C.) v. Pennsylvania,2 a federal district court reasoned
that because the school district could show no rational basis for
excluding students with disabilities from school, the students had a
constitutional right to public education under the Equal Protection
Clause.23 Furthermore, the court held that the school district had violated
parents' due process rights by failing to provide a hearing before denying
the children access to public schooling.24 Therefore, the court granted
students with mental retardation the right to attend Pennsylvania's public
schools 5 Additionally, the district court required the school district to
presume that placement in a regular class was preferable to placement in
a special education class.26
Subsequently, in 1972, the Federal Circuit for the District of Columbia
considered whether a school district had violated the Fifth Amendment
by excluding children with disabilities from public school. In Mills v.
Board of Education,27 the D.C. school district admitted that "an estimated
12,340 handicapped children were not to be served in the 1971-1972
school year." The seven children named in the suit were AfricanAmerican, had disabilities ranging from behavior disorders to brain
30
29
damage, and were excluded from public education. Relying on Brown
and other racial segregation cases,3' the D.C. Circuit held that the
children had been denied equal protection and due process of law
because they had not received a hearing prior to exclusion.32 The court
20. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 874-75 (D.D.C. 1972).
21. Id.; Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children (P.A.R.C.) v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa.
1971), subsequentproceedings at 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
22. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
23. P.A.R.C., 343 F. Supp. at 297.
24. Id. at 295.
25. Id. at 302.
26. P.A.R.C., 334 F. Supp. at 1260.
27. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.C. 1972).
28. Id. at 869.
29. Id. at 869-70.
30. Id. at 875 ("[Education], where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be
made available to all on equal terms."), quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
31. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874-75.
32. Id. at 875.
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considered the school district's claim of severely inadequate funds but
found that the school's available funds must be spent equitably so that
"[t]he inadequacies of the District of Columbia Public School
System... [would not] bear
more heavily on the... handicapped child
' 33
child."
normal
the
than on
In sum, in the late 1960s and early 1970s both Congress and the courts
began to remedy the segregation of students with disabilities from public
schools." Most importantly, courts recognized that under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments students with disabilities could not be excluded
from public school or unequally impacted when the school district
complained of insufficient funds.35
B.

Legislative History of the EducationforAll HandicappedChildren
Act and the IDEA

With P.A.R.C. and Mills providing the impetus for change, Congress
passed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act3 6 (EAHCA) in
1975.37 This was Congress' first attempt to create a comprehensive
solution to special education and to extend equal access to public schools
to students with disabilities across the country. 38 The Senate recognized
that funding was a major barrier for school districts trying to comply
with court decisions mandating inclusion.39 In response, Congress
increased federal funding for special education 4 to help school districts
meet their constitutional obligations.4'
The EAHCA made funding contingent on certain core requirements.4 2
A school district accepting funding had to provide a free appropriate
public education (FAPE)43 in the least restrictive environment 44 for all
33. Id. at 876.
34. See supranotes 12-18 and accompanying text.
35. See supranotes 19-33 and accompanying text.
36. Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988 and Supp. V 1993)).
37. S. REP. No. 94-168, at 6-7, (1975) reprintedin 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1430-31.
38. Id, at 17, 1425, 1441.
39. Id. at 7, 1431.
40. Id. at 14, 1438.
41. Id. at 9, 1433 ("It can no longer be the policy of the Government to merely establish an
unenforceable goal requiring all children to be in school.").
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1975) (98 Stat. 773,781).
43. Id. §§ 1401 (18), 1412(2-)(B) and (3) (89 Stat. 775, 780-81), currently found at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412 (a)(1)(A) (1997).
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special education students. The districts also had to ensure due process
for aggrieved familiesa5 and create written education plans outlining
placement and services for each student. 6
In 1990, the EAHCA was reauthorized as the IDEA.47 The 1990 law
included a new mandate for transition services4 8 to help older students
transition into post-school education, employment, or independent
residential settings." Congress most recently amended the IDEA in
1997,50 following two years of analysis and hearings. 1
C.

Overview of the Text and Structure of the IDEA's Mandates

As a grant-in-aid statute, the IDEA conditions federal funding on
compliance with certain conditions,52 some related to funding and
procedure, and some that specify the services states 53 must provide to
each special education student.54 First, states must provide a FAPE to all
students with disabilities from age 3 to 21 "regardless of the severity of
[the] ... disability. '55 "Appropriate" in this context does not mean that
schools must maximize the educational opportunities for students with
disabilities. 6 Rather, the school must provide "personalized instruction
to permit the child to benefit educationally
with sufficient support...
57
instruction.,
from that
Second, the school district must maintain a written individualized
education plan (IEP) for every child receiving special education. 8 The
IEP must be developed annually by an IEP team consisting of parents,
the student, if appropriate, the special education teacher, an
44. The EAHCA least restrictive environment provision was enacted as 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B)
(1975) and is substantially the same as the current provision at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (1997).
45. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1975) (ensuring a hearing before an impartial administrative officer).
46. Id. § 1414(a)(5).
47. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub.L.No 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990).
48. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii) (1997).
49. Id. § 1401(30).
50. Id. §§ 1400-1487.
51. 143 Cong. Rec. E951 (1997) (Statement of Representative George Miller of California).
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)-(22) (1997).
53. Local school districts must also demonstrate that they are in compliance with all state
requirements under § 1412. Id. § 1413(a)(2)-(7).
54. Id. § 1412(a)(I)-(22).
55. Id. § 1412(a)(1).
56. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198-201 (1982).
57. Id. at 203.
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4) (1997).
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administrator, and other service providers as needed. 9 The IEP team
must work together to create a document reflecting the child's current
levels of performance,6 0 a statement of annual goals, 61 a list of
supplementary aids and services the student needs to benefit from
instruction, 62 an explanation of the extent to which the student will not be
included with the regular class, 3 and a list of transition services for older
students' Parents participate in any team that makes a placement
decision for their child. 5
Finally, the law requires school districts to ensure that each student
with a disability receives services in the least restrictive environment,
stating "to the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities
[must be] educated with children who are not disabled .... -66
Furthermore, children can only be removed from the regular classroom
when education there cannot be satisfactorily achieved with the use of
supplementary aids and services.6 Therefore, the LRE provision creates
a two-pronged requirement.6 ' First, schools must attempt to educate
students with supplementary aids and services in the regular integrated
classroom.6 9 Second, if attempts to educate a disabled student in a regular
classroom do not work, the school may place the student in a more
segregated setting while mainstreaming the student to the maximum
extent appropriate. 70

59. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
60. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
61. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(ii).
62. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iii).
63. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iv).
64. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii).
65. Id. § 1414(f).
66. Id. § 1412(a)(5). This provision is known as the "mainstreaming" or "inclusion" requirement.
Mainstreaming refers to the practice of allowing children to attend the common or mainstream
school. Inclusion is the current term used to describe the integration of children with disabilities into
regular classrooms within those schools. See SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 167. Inclusion is the
preferred term in the field of special education. See Mavis v. Sobol, 839 F. Supp. 968, 971
(N.D.N.Y. 1993). The terms are used interchangeably in this Comment.
67. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (1997). Supplementary aids and services are "aids, services, and other
supports that are provided in regular education classes ...to enable children with disabilities to be
educated with non-disabled children to the maximum extent appropriate" Id. § 1401(29) (1997).
68. Id. § 1412(a)(5) (1997).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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CongressionalIntent Behind the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA

Congress amended the IDEA in 1997 in an effort to strengthen the Act
by utilizing more current information about how students with
disabilities should be served.7' The primary goals of the 1997 amendment
were to "strengthen the least restrictive environment requirement" 72 and
"increase participation of children with disabilities in the general
curriculum and regular... classroom.' , 73 In doing so, Congress
responded to circuit cases interpreting the LRE provision74 by
recognizing the importance of inclusion of students with disabilities in
the regular classroom.7 5
Then-President Clinton's statement upon signing the amendments into
law emphasized inclusion. 76 He noted that the amendments would "[put
a] sharper focus on improving educational results for these children
through greater access to the general curriculum."' This greater access is
aided by a new requirement that the regular education teacher be
included in the IEP team to ensure that special education students receive
appropriate support in the regular classroom.78
A second goal of the 1997 Amendments was to strengthen the role of
families in the special education process.7 9 Parents must be members of
any group that makes decisions about placement, including the child's
IEP team."0 Furthermore, parents must receive more frequent updates on

71. See 143 CONG. REc. E972-01, 972 (1997) (Representative Matthew G. Martinez of
California, stating that Congress received "significant input from groups and individuals who are
affected and served by the act").
72. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(ii) (1997) (including the regular teacher in the IEP team, thereby
ensuring appropriate support in the regular classroom).
73. 143 CONG. REC. E951-01, 951 (1997) (statement of Representative George Miller of
California).
74. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1207 (3d Cir. 1993); Greer v. Rome City Seh. Dist.,
950 F.2d 688, 695-96 (11th Cir. 1991); Bd. of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 878 (E.D. Cal.
1992).
75. 143 CONG. REc. E972-01, 972 (1997) (Representative Matthew G. Martinez of California,
stating that inclusion and integration were fundamental to the amendments, which "underscore] the
strong presumption in the law recognized by innumerable courts, that children with disabilities
should be educated with children without disabilities in the general... classroom.").
76. 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 147 (1997) (Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing
H.R. 5).
77. Id.
78. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(ii) (1997).
79. S. REP. No. 105-17, at 4 (1997), H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at 3 (1997).
80. S. REP. No. 105-17, at 23.
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their child's progress toward the IEP goals.8 The IDEA guarantees
students the opportunity to participate in the planning and placement
process82 by participating as members of their own JEP team if they are
able to do so.83 Older students may participate in their transition team,
which facilitates entry into the community after school ends.' Therefore,
the 1997 Amendments prenewed the importance of the LRE provision by
providing that the regular classroom must be the default placement and
emphasized the role of parent and student input into the decision-making
process.
E.

The Departmentof Education'sImplementing Regulationsfor the
LRE Mandate

The Department of Education promulgated its final regulations to the
1997 Amendments in 1999,85 to clarify how school districts can remain
in compliance.86 One requirement is that school districts must make
' ranging from less
available 7 a "continuum of alternative placements" 88
restrictive-like regular classes, special classes, and special schools-to
more restrictive-like home instruction or instruction in hospitals or
institutions.8 9 Each student receiving special education must be placed in
the least restrictive appropriate setting on that continuum." If the student
is placed in the regular classroom, supplementary aids and services must
be provided as needed,9 and students may not be removed from the
regular classroom simply because the general curriculum must be
modified for them. 92

81. Id. at22.
82. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(B)(vii); 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii) (1997).
83. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(vii).
84. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii).
85. Jean B. Crockett, The Least Restrictive Environment and the 1997 IDEA Amendments and
FederalRegulations,28 J.L. & EDUC. 543,544 (1999).
86. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.550-556 (1999).
87. A small school district need not create and fund a whole range of settings, but may "borrow"
more specialized services or settings from nearby school districts. See infra notes 135-39 and
accompanying text.
88. 34 C.F.R. § 300.551 (1999).
89. Id. § 300.551(b)(1).

90. Id. § 300.551(a).
91. Id. § 300551(b)(2).
92. Id. § 300.552(e).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 77:809, 2002

Furthermore, if students with disabilities cannot be included in a
regular class for academic work, then they should participate in nonacademic activities to the maximum extent appropriate. 93 For example, a
student should be allowed to join his or her regular education classmates
for activities like meals and recess periods. 4 In doing so, a student with a
disability can maintain contact with non-disabled peers "to the maximum
extent appropriate to the needs of that child."95
The Department of Education's regulations remind school districts of
the strong Congressional preference for mainstreaming students with
disabilities.96 Before a child can be placed outside of the regular
classroom, "the full range of supplementary aids and services that if
provided would facilitate the student's placement in the regular
classroom setting must be considered." 97 To this end, the Department of
Education emphasized using a continuum of placements9" to ensure the
appropriate setting for each student. The default placement on that
spectrum must be a regular classroom, and a student with a disability
should only be removed if education with supplementary aids and
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 99 Finally, if a student with a
disability is segregated, he or she must still be included with regular
peers for non-academic activities like lunch and recess to the maximum
extent appropriate.
II.

CURRENT JUDICIAL TESTS FOR ASSESSING SCHOOL
DISTRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE LRE REQUIREMENT

Given the historical purpose of the IDEA to remedy segregation of
students with disabilities" ° and Congress' current strong preference for
their inclusion, 10 ' how do courts determine when a student's exclusion
from the regular classroom violates the LRE provision? Although the
U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the IDEA's FAPE provision,0 2 the

93. Id. § 300.553.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. Appendix A to Part 300 (Question 1).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 300.551.
99. Id. § 300.550(b)(2).
100. See infra Part I.A.
101. See infra Part I.D.
102. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198-201 (1982).
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Court has not yet heard a case involving the LRE provision, thereby
leaving the circuit courts to devise their own tests. 0 3 The tests created by
the circuits have taken different forms and emphasize varying aspects of
the LRE provision. One test emphasizes the feasibility of providing
supplementary services,"0 4 while a second test employs a two-part
framework derived from the language of IDEA." 5 The third is a fourfactor balancing test incorporating elements from prior cases. 10 6 Finally,
some district courts have used a hybrid test that blends two prior
approaches. 7
A.

The Roncker Portability/FeasibilityTest

1.

Roncker v. Walters

Neill Roncker was a nine-year-old boy with severe mental retardation
and seizures."' Neill's school district decided to place him in a school
that exclusively served students with retardation;0 9 thus Neill would
have had no interaction with non-disabled students."0 Neill's parents
refused the placement"' and appealed to an impartial hearing officer."'
Subsequently, they filed suit in a federal district court, claiming that the
placement violated the LRE provision."' The district court ruled in the
school's favor, holding that the LRE provision gave school officials
broad discretion to choose Neil's placement." 4

103. See, e.g., Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd.
of Edu=., 874 F.2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir. 1989); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14
F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994).
104. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
105. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1046.
106. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1404.
107. See, e.g., D.F. v. W. Sch. Corp., 921 F. Supp. 559,567 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
108. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1060.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1061.
112. Id Parents may request an impartial due process hearing to review a district's placement
decision. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (1997); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.507-300.508 (1999). Parents may appeal to
the state board of education, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g), and then to a federal district court. Id.
§ 1415(i)(2).
113. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1060.
114. Id.
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On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found no available
testI15 to assess whether the school district had violated the LRE
provision under the 1975 EAHCA." 6 The Sixth Circuit developed its
own test, holding that "[i]n a case where a segregated facility is
considered superior, the court should determine whether the services
which make that placement superior can feasibly be provided in a nonsegregated setting. If they can, the placement
in the segregated school
' 17
would be inappropriate under the Act."'
The Sixth Circuit justified this feasibility-based test by explaining that
it respected Congress' strong preference for mainstreaming, but also
recognized that inclusion is inappropriate for some children." 8 This
analysis required the court to balance the benefits Neill would receive in
the regular classroom against the benefits of a segregated setting. 19 The
Sixth Circuit further held that this test required courts to honor Congress'
"strong preference" for mainstreaming by requiring that the benefits of a
segregated setting "far outweigh" the benefits of mainstreaming to justify
a segregated placement. 2
The Roncker court suggested factors that might impact this balance.'
When deciding whether the benefits of segregation are strong enough,
courts may consider whether the student is a "disruptive force" in the
classroom.'
If the student is too disruptive to the other students or
requires too much supervision by the teacher, those facts may favor a
segregated setting."' In addition, if the disruptive student would only
receive "marginal benefit" in the regular classroom, a more restrictive
environment may be appropriate.'2 4
The Roncker court also considered the cost of inclusion."z If a student
requires extensive resources to the detriment of other students in the
district, it may not be practically possible to keep the student in the

115. The Rowley case only addressed the FAPE provision, not the LRE provision. Rowley, 458
U.S. at 202-03.
116. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1059.
117. Id. at 1063.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (basing its discussion of cost on a single case without citing any statutory authority).
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integrated setting."" However, a school district claiming cost as a
defense must show that it has used its federal funds to create a "proper
continuum of alternative placements for handicapped children."'2 7
2.

Subsequent Application Of The Roncker Test

The Sixth Circuit framed the Roncker test in terms of feasibility of
integration based on the portability of services from segregated settings
into integrated ones, and suggested a variety of factors for courts to
consider."z The Eighth Circuit adopted the Rockner test in A.W. v.
Northwest R-1 School District,2 9 a case involving an elementary school
student with Down syndrome. 3 ' The Eighth Circuit focused heavily on
the issue of cost by citing a state's need to properly allocate resources'
and approved an inquiry into whether the cost of mainstreaming one
student would take financial resources away from the education of other
students with disabilities. 32 Based on the Roncker test, which suggested
that cost is a "proper factor to consider since excessive spending on one
handicapped child deprives other handicapped children,"' 33 the Eighth
Circuit held that the regular placement of A.W. was not feasible based on
4
13

CoSt.

In Age v. Bullitt County Schools,135 the Sixth Circuit considered the
placement of a deaf student, Michael Age, whose IEP required an oral
method for communication rather than sign language. 36 Because the
school district did not have an oral program, it paid for transportation to
another school that did. 137 Michael's parents claimed that the school
126. See id.

127. Id.
128. The Fourth Circuit in DeVries v. Fairfax County School District,882 F.2d 876, 879-80 (4th
Cir. 1989) gave this test cursory treatment. The court recited the Roncker test but did not apply its
"feasibility" analysis when discussing the benefits and detriments of two placement options. Id.
Deferring instead to the district court's findings that the student could not be educated at the local
high school, the court affirmed the segregated placement of a student with autism. Id. at 880.
129. 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987).
130. A.W., 813 F.2d at 160.
131. ld. at 163-64.
132. Id. at 164 ([A]vailable financial resources must be equitably distributed among all
handicapped students:').
133. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
134. A.W., 813 F.2d. at 165.
135. 673 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1982).
136. Id. at 143.
137. Id.
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district should pay for an oral program at his local school, but a district
court found the commuting program was appropriate. 38 The Sixth
Circuit agreed, holding that the school district should not have to create a
program just for Michael and that the district had fairly reconciled
Michael's needs with the need to39allocate scarce funds among as many
handicapped children as possible.
Still, the Sixth Circuit in Roncker argued that the cost of including a
particular student cannot be properly considered without first finding that
a school district has used its available funds to create a continuum of
alternative placements for all students with disabilities. 140 Proper use of
federal funds was thus shown to be a threshold that a school district must
overcome before it can claim the high cost of mainstreaming as a
141
defense.
In summary, the Roncker test asks courts to assess whether it is
feasible to provide the needed services in a regular classroom, based on
the portability of the services. To do so, courts must balance the benefits
of an integrated setting against a segregated setting but can only approve
a segregated setting if its benefits "far outweigh"' 42 those of the
integrated classroom. Courts may consider factors like disruptiveness or
cost of providing services in the regular classroom. However, as
subsequent courts have noted, school districts may only raise the issue of
high cost if they first show that they have used their federal funds to
create a continuum of appropriate placements.
B.

The Daniel R.R. Two-Prong Test

1.

Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education

In 1989, the Fifth Circuit declined to follow the Roncker test 4 3 and
44
formulated its own test in Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education.
Daniel was a six-year-old boy with Down syndrome who attended a

138. Id. at 145.
139. Id. See also A. W., 813 F.2d at 163-64.
140. See Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
141. See Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514, 517 (6th Cir. 1984) (reaffirming
Roncker by holding that "cost considerations are only relevant when choosing [among] several
options, all of which offer an 'appropriate' education").
142. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
143. 874 F.2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir. 1989).
144. Id.
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regular pre-kindergarten class.' 45 Although the regular teacher modified
both the curriculum and her teaching methods, Daniel required constant
attention and failed to master basic skills.146 Based on the teacher's
complaints, the school district assigned Daniel to a special education
class where his only interaction with non-disabled peers occurred during
lunch and recess.1 47 Daniel's parents appealed the decision to the district
court, claiming that Daniel's new placement was a violation of the LRE
4
provision. 1
The district court reviewed the administrative record and granted
summary judgment in favor of the school district, 49 noting Daniel's50
inability to receive "educational benefit" in the regular classroom.1
After considering the history of the EAHCA and the dual mandates of
free appropriate education and least restrictive environment, the Fifth
Circuit declined to follow the Roncker analysis.15 ' The court found that
Roncker's feasibility test required "too intrusive an inquiry" into
educational policy choices that Congress intended to leave to local
school officials.' Furthermore, the Roncker test made "little reference to
the language of the [Act].' 5.
Looking to the text of the LRE provision of the EAHCA,15 the Fifth
Circuit created a two-part test: (1) Can education in the regular
classroom, with supplemental aids and services, be achieved
satisfactorily? (2) If it cannot and the school intends to remove the
student from regular education, is the student then mainstreamed to the
maximum extent appropriate? 55 The Daniel R.R.56court derived this test
directly from the language of the LRE provision.
The Fifth Circuit recognized that its least restrictive environment
analysis is individualized and fact-specific. 7 In order to apply its first
145. Id. at 1039.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1038, 1040.
149. Id. at 1040.
150. Id. (affirming the hearing officer's ruling).
151. Id. at 1046.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. EAHCA's LRE provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (5)(B) (1991), is substantially the same in
the current version of IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (1997).
155. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1050.
156. See supra,notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
157. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048.
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prong, 15 8 the court looked to a non-exhaustive list containing "a variety
of factors [that] will inform... our inquiry."' 59 The Fifth Circuit
determined that first courts should consider whether the school has taken
sufficient steps to accommodate the student in a regular classroom by
means of supplementary aids and services. 160 The court. cautioned that
this requirement is not limitless: courts may consider the impact on the
regular education teacher's workload and the extent of the modifications
required 6 ' but must take more than token steps to accommodate a
student's needs. 62 In this case, the Fifth Circuit found that the school
district had made a genuine effort to accommodate Daniel in the regular
63
classroom.1

Second, the Fifth Circuit examined whether Daniel was receiving
"educational benefit" from regular education and concluded he was
receiving little educational benefit in the pre-kindergarten class.' 14 The
court explained that other benefits must still be considered, such as
improved communication or social skills. 65 A student who might "be
able to absorb only a minimal amount of the [regular academic
curriculum], but may benefit enormously from the language models that
his nonhandicapped peers provide for him" could still be placed in the
regular classroom. 66 However, the Fifth Circuit also found that Daniel
received only marginal non-academic benefits. 67
The Fifth Circuit then considered the impact of Daniel's presence on
the classroom environment. 168 The court noted that a student might be
either so disruptive or require so much individual attention that the

158. Id. at 1050.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1048.
161. Id. at 1048-49 ("[M]ainstreaming would be pointless if we forced instructors to modify the
regular ...curriculum to the extent that the handicapped child is not required to learn any of the
skills normally taught in regular education. The child would be receiving special education
instruction in the regular education classroom; the only advantage to such an arrangement would be
that the child is sitting next to a nonhandicapped student.").
162. Id. at 1048.
163. Id. at 1050 (finding the regular education teacher made "creative efforts" to reach Daniel,
devoted substantial time attending to him, and modified the curriculum).
164. Id. (finding that Daniel's developmental level was much lower than the other students, so the
only real benefit was the "opportunity to associate" with non-disabled peers).
165. Id. at 1049.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1051.
168. Id. at 1049-51.
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quality of education for the rest of the class suffers.169 In Daniel's case,
he required so much one-on-one assistance from the teacher that other
students were negatively impacted. 7 ' Finally, although the cost of
case,
supplementary aids and services was not an issue in this particular
171
well.
as
considered
be
may
cost
that
mention
the Fifth Circuit did
Applying these factors under the first prong of the test, the Fifth
Circuit upheld Daniel's removal to a segregated special education class 7 '
because all the factors weighed against placement in the regular
classroom. 73 As to the second prong of their test, the court found that
Daniel had been mainstreamed as much as possible because he remained
integrated for lunch and recess. 74
2.

SubsequentApplication of the Daniel R.R. Test

The Daniel R.R. test was adopted by the Third Circuit in Oberti v.
Board of Education.75 Rafael Oberti, an eight-year-old boy with Down
syndrome, was removed from a regular class and placed in a segregated
classroom. 7 6 Rafael's parents objected and requested a due process
hearing."7 After mediation, a due process hearing, and a trial in district
court where the Obertis won, the school district appealed.'78
On appeal, the Third Circuit chose to apply the Daniel R.R. test.179 The
court noted the similarities between the two-part test and the language of
IDEA, including the test's emphasis on inclusion to the "maximum
extent appropriate" and the requirement of individualized programs to
meet "each child's specific needs."' 8 ° However, the Third Circuit
169. Id. at 1049.
170. Id. at 1051.
171. Id. at 1049 n.9.
172. Id. at 1052.
173. Id. at 1050.
174. Id. at 1051.
175. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 999 F.2d 1204, 1212 (3d Cir. 1993). The Eleventh Circuit also
adopted the two-part test because it "adheres so closely to the language of the Act, and, therefore,
clearly reflects Congressional intent[.]" Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 696 (11 th Cir.
1991). The Greercourt applied the following factors under the first prong: (1) a comparison of the
benefits of regular education with supplementary supports versus segregated special education; (2)
the disruptive effect of the student; and (3) the cost of providing supplementary services. Id. at 697.

176. Id.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 1208.
Id. at 1208-12.
ld. at 1215.
Id.
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balanced its own list of factors under the first prong, including: (1)
whether the school took reasonable steps to include the student in a
regular classroom with supplementary aids and services; (2) a balance of
the benefits the student received in the regular classroom with the
benefits of a segregated special education classroom; and (3) any
disruptive or negative impact on the classroom. 181 Furthermore, the
Oberti court was the first to recognize the reciprocal benefits for students
without disabilities, such as learning to communicate and interact with
persons with disabilities."2
Applying this test to Rafael's setting, the Third Circuit made a
8 3 and found that (1)
detailed examination of the school district's efforts"
the school district had only made negligible attempts to accommodate
Rafael with supplementary aids and services;' 84 (2) Rafael would receive
educational benefit in the regular classroom;185 and (3) Rafael's
disruptive behavior problems would likely be minimized or eliminated if
appropriate aids and services were provided.186 Therefore, according to
the Third Circuit, the school district had not provided Rafael with an
education in the least restrictive environment under the first prong of the
Daniel R.R. test,'87 leaving no need to apply the second prong. 88
Like the Roncker test,' 89 subsequent application of the Daniel R.R. test
has revealed that some factors involve threshold questions, which require
proof of one element before a particular factor can be properly
considered. For example, in Girty v. School District of Valley Grove,'9" a
district court held that before a court can compare the educational
benefits of a regular classroom with those of a special education
classroom, the school district must first show that it has attempted to
provide supplementary aids and services in the regular classroom. 19' In
Girty, the court assessed a proposed segregated placement' 92 and applied
181. Id. at 1216-17. Cost may also be a factor but the parties did not raise it in this case. Id. at
1218 n.25.
182. Id. at 1217 n.24.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 1220-21.
Id. at 1220.
Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1222.
ld.
Id. at 1223.
See supra Part II.A.2.
163 F. Supp. 2d 527 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
ld. at 535-37.
Id. at 528.
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the first prong of the Daniel R.R. test: whether "education in the regular
classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and services, can be
achieved satisfactorily." 93 The court determined that the school district
never made a good-faith effort to include the student or provide
supplementary services, thereby failing the first factor.'94 The second
factor-balancing the educational benefits of regular education with
supplementary aids and services against the benefits of a segregated
classroom' 9 -was impossible for the court to consider, given that the
school district had not ever made an effort to provide those services.'9 6
Therefore, the threshold for any comparison between the benefits of
regular education and segregated education is a school district showing
that it has in fact made a reasonable attempt to educate the student in a
regular classroom with supplemental aids or services. Unless the first
factor under the first prong of the Daniel R.R. test has been met, a court
cannot properly consider the second factor.197
A district court in the Second Circuit' 98 applied the Daniel R.R. test in
Mavis v. Sobol 99 and was one of the first courts to acknowledge the
relationship between the provision of supplementary aids and services
and the student's level of classroom disruption.2 0 Under the Daniel R.R.
third factor-the disruptive effect of the student's presence in the
classroom-the Mavis court reasoned that Emily Mavis might have been
less disruptive had she been provided with adequate supplemental aids
and services."sl Because the school district could not know if her
behavioral problems would cease if she received proper assistance, the
court held that the school district "cannot rely on Emily's asserted
behavioral difficulties as justification for removing her from a regular

193. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 999 F.2d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of
Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989)).
194. Girty, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
195. Oberti,995 F.2d at 1216.
196. Giny, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 535-37.
197. DanielR.R., 874 F.2d at 1048 ("If the state has made no effort to take such accommodating
steps, our inquiry ends, for the state is in violation of the Act's express mandate to supplement and
modify regular education."). However, this statement was dictum because the school district had
taken "creative" steps to tryto include Daniel and provide him with support. Id. at 1050.
198. The Second Circuit has not formally adopted a test. In Briggs v. Board of Education, 882
F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1989) the Second Circuit found the Rowley analysis controlling, and.
overturned a district court opinion applying Roncker.
199. 839 F. Supp. 968 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).

200. Id. at 991.
201. Id.at989-91.
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classroom." 2 2 The Mavis court indicated that the school district must
show that it has attempted education in the regular classroom with
supplementary aids and services, or it may fail the third factor of the
7 3
Daniel R.R. test as well.'
Other courts have agreed that a relationship exists between a student's
disruptiveness and the provision of supplementary aids and services
under the first prong of the Daniel R.R. test. The Oberti court noted that
"[a]n adequate individualized program with.., aids and services may
prevent disruption that would otherwise occur., 20 4 In D.B. v. Ocean
Township Board of Education, 5 another district court in the Second
Circuit held that "in considering the possible negative effect of the
child's presence on the other students, the court must keep in mind the
school's obligation under the Act to provide supplementary aids and
services to accommodate the child's disabilities. 2 6 Thus, a school
district's failure to demonstrate that it has reasonably attempted
mainstreaning in the regular classroom with supplementary aids and
services may prevent the district from successfully arguing that the
student's disruptiveness should weigh against mainstreaming.
As shown above, subsequent applications of the Daniel R.R. test
reveal that when courts are considering the first prong-whether
education in the regular classroom with supplementary aids and services
can be satisfactorily achieved-a school district's reasonable attempt at
providing services in the regular classroom is key to the analysis. 20
Unless a school district can show that it has attempted to provide
supplementary aids and services in the regular classroom, a court will not
be able to appropriately weigh the benefits of the regular classroom
against a segregated one or properly assess a school's claim that a
20 8
student is disruptive.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 991; see also Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1222 (3d Cir. 1993).
Mavis, 839 F. Supp. at 991.
Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1217.
985 F. Supp. 457 (D.N.J. 1997).
Id. at 489 (quoting Oberti,995 F.2d at 1217).
See supranotes 191,201 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 195, 201-02 and accompanying text.
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D.

The Rachel 11 Balancing Test

1.

Sacramento City Unified School District v. Rachel 11

In 1994, the Ninth Circuit adopted a district court's least restrictive
environment test,2 9 which drew elements from both Daniel R.R. and
Roncker.2 1° In Sacramento City Unified School Districtv. Rachel H.,2"
the court considered the placement of Rachel Holland, a moderately
retarded eleven-year-old girl.212 After spending years in special education
programs, Rachel's parents advocated for full-time placement in a
regular classroom. 213 The school district proposed splitting Rachel's time
between special education classes for academic subjects, and regular
classrooms for art, music, lunch, and recess. 214 Rachel's parents rejected
this proposal and appealed, alleging a violation of the LRE provision.21 5
The district court did not adopt an established test and did not offer
any rationale for not doing so.216 Instead it looked to the variety of factors
that had been considered by the other courts.217 The Rachel H. court
concluded that the four most important factors were: (1) the educational
benefits available in a regular classroom with supplementary aids and
services, compared to the benefits of a special education classroom; (2)
the non-academic benefits of interaction with non-disabled students; (3)
the impact of the student with a disability on the teacher and other
children in the regular classroom; and (4) the cost of supplementary aids
and services required for mainstreaming the student.1 8
Applying these factors, the court found: (1) Rachel could be
satisfactorily educated in the regular classroom if she had supplementary
services; 219 (2) Rachel's improved self-esteem and enthusiasm were
209. Bd. of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 878 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
210. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994), reaffirmed in
Poolaw v. Bishop, 67 F.3d 830, 836 (9th Cir. 1995).
211. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398.
212. Id.at 1400.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Bd. of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 878 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 878. See also Kevin D. Stanley, Note, A Model for Interpretation of Mainstreaming
Compliance Under the Individualswith DisabilitiesEducation Act: Board of Education v. Holland,
65 UMKC L REV. 303, 317 (1996) (noting that school districts can often save money by
mainstreaming students as opposed to maintaining separate, segregated classroom facilities).
219. Holland,786 F. Supp. at 880.
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important non-academic benefits of inclusion; 220 (3) Rachel was not
disruptive in the classroom; 221 and (4) the district had not met its burden
of showing excessive cost. 2 Because all four factors favored inclusion,
223
the court ruled that Rachel be placed in the regular classroom.
Reasoning that the district court's analysis directly addressed the issue of
appropriate placement in the least restrictive environment, the Ninth
Circuit, in a brief opinion, affirmed the decision and adopted the test set
forth by the district court.224
Later in Seattle School District v. B. S., the Ninth Circuit clarified
that "educational benefit" should be broadly interpreted to include
"academic, social, health, emotional, communicative, physical, and
vocational needs." 226 Thus, the first prong need not be strictly
"academic" in nature, but may include any social, communicative, or
physical goals that are part of the student's individualized education
program.22 7
2.

SubsequentApplication of the Rachel H4_
Factors

Recently a district court in the Seventh Circuit devised a mixed test
using the two-part framework of Daniel R.R., and the four factors from
Rachel H.'2 In D.F. v. Western School Corporation,"9 the court
220. Id. at 882.
221. Id. at 883.
222. Id. at 883-84.
223. Id. at 884
224. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994). (noting
this "analysis directly addresses the issue of the appropriate placement for a child with
disabilities[,j ...we approve and adopt the test employed by the district court.").
225. 82 F.3d 1493 (9th Cir. 1996). A high school student was expelled and hospitalized due to
severe emotional/behavioral problems. Id. at 1496. The court found the regular classroom placement
inappropriate because although the student was bright and did well on standardized tests,
"educational benefit" included considerations beyond mere academic performance. Id. at 1500.
Therefore the court could consider the student's behavioral and emotional progress as well. See id. at
1500-01.
226. Id. at 1500.
227. Id.
228. D.F. v. W. Sch. Corp. 921 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Ind. 1996). The Seventh Circuit has considered
the existing tests but declined to adopt one. See, e.g., Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493, 499 (7th
Cir. 2002); Monticello Sch. Dist. v. George L., 102 F.3d 895, 906 (7th Cir. 1996).
229. 921 F. Supp. 559. This blended approach was used again in the Seventh Circuit in Beth B. v.
Van Clay, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14094 (N.D. Ill.
2001), affirmed at 282 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. 2002),
which used the Daniel R.R. framework but applied the Rachel H. factors and added a Roncker
analysis as well. Id. at *24.
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considered the first two Rachel H. factorsID and found they both weighed
strongly againstinclusion of an autistic student who tended to engage in
disruptive stereotypic behaviorsTI 1 Because the first two factors weighed
against mainstreaming, the court found it unnecessary to consider the
two other countervailing factors that may have weighed in favor of
inclusion. 2 The court's analysis indicates that it did not view the Rachel
H. factors as being equally weighted because even if the last two factors
favored inclusion, they could not overcome the disfavor created by the
first two. 3 3 D.F. demonstrates that the factors may be of unequal
importance and that unfavorable findings on certain factors may "trump"
other factors completely. The Rachel H. opinion itself gives no guidance
on the proper weight of each factor or the result in case of a tie."
Therefore, the Rachel H. test may have some inherent complexities
similar to the5"threshold" analyses noted by courts applying Roncker and
2
DanielR.R.
Application of the varying tests for determining compliance with the
LRE provision leads to potential disparity in outcomes, depending solely
on geographic location. Such disparity could be avoided with the
adoption of a single, nationwide test. Although all of the current tests
contain positive aspects, none has been applied without question or
alteration. Therefore, a synthesis of the existing tests that accounts for
their full development would remedy the wide variations that exist in
courts across the country.
I. A PROPOSED SYNTHESIS OF THE EXISTING TESTS
The various tests that courts have developed for determining
compliance with the IDEA's requirement that school districts educate

230. See supranote 207.
231. D.F., 921 F. Supp. at 570 (emphasis added). Stereotypic and repetitive motor movements
(also known as "self-stimulatory" behaviors) are common in some students with autism, and may
include rocking back and forth, flapping hands, and shaking the head repeatedly. See AMIERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 67 (4th ed.
1994).
232. The third and fourth Rachel H. factors are the potential negative impact on the classroom and
the cost of mainstreaming. See Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404. See also supranote 218.
233. Bd. of Educ. v. Holland, 921 F. Supp. 559,570-71 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
234. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1404. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1404; see also Poolaw v. Bishop, 67 F.3d
830, 837 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding two factors weighing in favor of mainstreaming and two against,
yet upholding a more segregated setting due mainly to lack of educational benefit)
235. See supra,Parts II.A.2 and B.2.
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special education students in the least restrictive environment can
become quite complex depending on the factual situations to which they
are applied. The tests for assessing school district compliance with the
LRE provision vary widely across the country. However, a uniform test
that adopts the best elements of the current tests and emphasizes
congressional intent behind the LRE provision could eliminate disparate
impacts on students and provide a predictable framework under which
school districts and courts can analyze least restrictive environment
issues. Furthermore, an additional factor considering parent and student
participation could ultimately ensure that disabled students are
adequately served in compliance with congressional intent.
A.

The Need for a Uniform, Nationwide Test

The U.S. Supreme Court should adopt a uniform national test for
determining compliance with the LRE provision that adopts the best
aspects of the circuit tests while accounting for subsequent development
and recent IDEA amendments. First, adoption of a uniform test would
ensure that courts apply the IDEA provision equally across the country.
The tests for assessing compliance with the LRE provision vary
widely; 6 thus the same case could be resolved quite differently
depending on where the student's school is located, 7 as Kevin and Rina
illustrate in the introduction. 8 Parents of students with disabilities who
want their child to receive an integrated education may be forced to
"forum shop" for a school located in a federal district that applies a
favorable law. 9 Most importantly, Congress and the courts consider the
integration of students with disabilities to be an issue of constitutional
magnitude.2 40 It is critical that these vital civil rights be fairly applied to
each student no matter where he or she happens to live.
Second, the Supreme Court should not merely adopt one of the
existing tests because each has been either criticized or further developed
since its inception. In short, none of the tests has proven as

236. See supra Part 11.
237. See supra Part II.
238. See supranotes 1-2 and accompanying text.
239. See Rebecca Weber Goldman, A Free Appropriate Education in the Least Restrictive
Environment: Promises Made, Promises Broken by the Individualswith DisabilitiesEducation Act,
20 DAYTON L. REv. 243,290 (1994).
240. See supra notes 23-24, 32 and accompanying text; see also S. REP. 94-168, at 6-7, (1975),
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1430-31.
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comprehensive as first hoped. In resolving the circuit split, the Supreme
Court should address the criticisms and improvements suggested by
courts with the practical experience of applying these tests. For example,
the Roncker test was criticized by the Daniel R.R. court as being both too
intrusive into decisions best left to school districts and not faithful to the
language of the statute.241 The Daniel R.R. test uses factors that may
require "threshold" inquiries before the factors can be properly
considered.2 42 The Rachel H. test fails to provide appropriate guidance as
to the proper weight given to each of the four factors in case of a tie.243
Thus none of the current circuit tests adequately defines the scope of
analysis and a new test should explicitly address these concerns.
Third, the resolution of the circuit split should be responsive to
Congress' changing goals and better understanding about how to educate
students with disabilities. 2' Since the Roncker decision in 1983, the
EAHCA has been reauthorized and renamed, amended, and has spawned
new implementing regulations.245 All of the current tests were created
before the 1997 amendments and the 1999 regulations.246 Adopting a
new uniform test at this time would provide an opportunity to reassess
both the framework and the factors in light of changes in the law since
1997. Congress' goals in adopting the 1997 Amendments included
strengthening the role of parents by increasing their involvement in
decision-making2 47 and improving access to the general education
curriculum by including the regular education teacher as part of the IEP
team.248 These goals should be clearly reflected in a new test. In sum, the
Supreme Court should resolve this circuit split in order to create a
nationwide rule that remedies the shortcomings of the current circuit
analyses and adequately reflects Congress' 1997 Amendments to the
IDEA.

241. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir. 1989).
242. See supranotes 190-97, 201-03 and accompanying text.
243. See Sacramento City Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994).
244. See supranote 71.
245. See supraPart I.B.
246. The Roncker decision occurred in 1983, Daniel R.R. in 1989, Rachel H.in 1994, and W. Sch.
Corp. in 1996. See supraParts lI.A-C.
247. See supranotes 79-81 and accompanying text.
248. See supranotes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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The AppropriateBasic Test

It is important to address the appropriate basic test before considering
which relevant factors will assist with the analysis under that test. As
noted by the Daniel R.R. court, the appropriate starting place for any test
should be the language of the statute it purports to interpret.2 49 Therefore,
the two-prong structure adopted by Daniel R.R. is the most appropriate
test for assessing school district compliance with the LRE mandate
because it closely follows the language and intent of IDEA."O The test
consists of two questions: (1) Can the student be educated satisfactorily
in the regular classroom when provided supplementary aids and
services? (2) If the student must be placed in a more segregated setting,
has the student been mainstreamed to the maximum extent possible?"'
The factors listed by the circuit courts would then be used to guide the
analysis of the first prong, because the second prong is a fairly simple
test to apply. 2
Furthermore, this framework adheres to the intent behind the LRE
requirement by making inclusion the default setting so that a student is
only removed if education with supplemental aids and services cannot be
achieved satisfactorily. 253 In addition, the test acknowledges that not
every child can be placed in the regular classroom, but if a student is
segregated, he or she must be mainstreamed for non-academic activities
to the maximum extent possible.u4
This framework is superior to the Roncker test because it follows
congressional intent while retaining proper deference toward local
decision-makers. It simply does not require as intrusive an inquiry into
the feasibility of providing certain services as the Roncker test does. 25
The two-part framework also has advantages over the Rachel H. test. The
Rachel H. test requires consideration of factors like cost and student
249. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989).
250. See Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1993) ("We think this two-part test,
which closely tracks the language of [the LRE requirement], is faithful to IDEA's directive that
children with disabilities be educated with nondisabled children 'to the maximum extent
appropriate."'); See also Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 696 (llth Cir. 1991)
("Because this test adhers so closely to the langauge of the Act and, therefor, clearly reflects
Congressional intent, we adopt it.").
251. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048.
252. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
253. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (1997); see generally supra Part I.D.
254. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.553; see supranote 95 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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disruptiveness that might not be relevant in every case. For example, the
Rachel H. test included cost as a factor,256 yet several courts have
declined to address cost if it was not raised by the parties.s 7 In contrast,
the two-part framework would allow courts to pick and choose relevant
factors to consider under the first prong depending on the facts of each
cases 8 Therefore, the two-part framework reflects the structure and
intent of the LRE provision while maintaining the flexibility necessary
for case-by-case analysis.
C.

Analysis of Relevant Factors

To assess the first prong of the framework-whether education in the
regular classroom can be satisfactorily achieved with supplemental aids
and services-there are several factors that courts have used to guide
their analysis. The factors that have emerged over the years include: the
steps taken to provide supplementary aids and services in the regular
classroom, the academic and non-academic benefits to the student, the
reciprocal benefits to the other students in the class, the student's
disruptive impact on the regular class, the impact on the workload or
time of the regular teacher, and the cost of inclusion. 9 Although only
factors relevant to a student's unique case should be considered,2 6' all of
these factors deserve discussion in addition to a proposed new factor-a
consideration of parent and student involvement in the decision-making
process.

256. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994).
257. See Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 35 F.3d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir 1994) (applying the first
three Rachel H. factors, but discarding the "cost' factor because it was not relevant to the case); see
also Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1218, n.25 (3d Cir. 1993) (same); Greer v. Rome City
Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 698-99 (11th Cir. 1991) (same); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874
F.2d 1036, 1049 n.9 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983)
(same).
258. See supra note 229 and accompanying text; see also Beth B. v. Van Clay, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1404 *23, *24 (N.D. 111.2001) ("We do not find anything in [the Rachel H. test]
objectionable. The factors considered are all relevant to a determination of whether the placement is
both appropriate and least restrictive. But we agree with the Fifth Circuit that the factors must be
case-specific. Daniel R.R. draws on the statutory language to set a general framework-a test-and
then examines several factors in its application of that test.").
259. See supra Parts II.A.-D.
260. See supranote 258 and accompanying text.
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Has the School DistrictTaken Steps to Educate the Student in a
RegularEducation Classroomwith Supplementary Aids and
Services?

Initially, courts should ask whether the school district has taken steps
to educate the student in the regular classroom with the use of
supplementary aids and services.26' This factor should be considered
first, in part because it is derived from the language of IDEA.262 The
IDEA requires school districts to make an attempt to educate students in
the regular classroom, removing them only if education with
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 2 63 This
reflects Congress' intent that the regular classroom would be the default
setting.! Congress also intended the 1997 Amendments to improve
disabled students' access to the general curriculum and regular
classrooms. 265 For many students, this inclusion would not be possible
without supplementary aids and services.
Courts should further consider this factor first because several courts
have correctly held it to be part of a threshold analysis that must be met
before other factors can be properly considered.266 Unless a school
district can show that it has tried to educate a student in the regular
classroom with the use of supplementary aids and services, 267 a court
cannot properly conduct a comparison of the benefits of regular and
segregated special education, nor can it assess whether the student's level
of disruption should weigh against inclusion-if that disruption might be
268
lessened or eliminated with proper supplementary assistance.
Therefore, because this factor gives effect to the language of the LRE

261. See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048.
262- Id. at 1048; see also 30 C.F.R. Part 300, Appendix A (Question) ("[B]efore a disabled child
can be placed outside of the regular educational environment, the full range of supplementary aids
and services that if provided would facilitate the student's placement in the regulare classroom
setting must be considered.").
263. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (1997); see supra Part I.C.
264. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (1997).
265. See supranotes 77-78 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 190-97, 201-03 and accompanying text.
267. A student's needs may be so severe that it would not be appropriate to even attempt
education in a regular classroom. In those situations, a student need not fail first in an integrated
setting in order to be placed in a more appropriate, yet more segregated, setting. See 34 C.F.R.
Appendix A to Part 300 (Question 1) (1999).
268. See supra notes 190-97, 201-03 and accompanying text.
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provision and provides a threshold that must be met before other factors
can be properly considered, 69 it should be considered first.
2.

Compare the EducationalBenefit the Student Received With
SupplementaryAids and Services in RegularEducation With the
EducationalBenefits of a More SegregatedSetting

Once a school district has attempted regular education with
supplementary aids and services, courts can then compare the
educational benefit the student received in the regular class to the
educational benefits of a more restrictive setting. This factor has been
used by several courts27 and should be an important part of a uniform
test. It not only echoes the concerns of the courts, but also tracks both
Congressional intent and the language of the statute itself.2 7' Comparing
the benefits of different settings permits courts to assess whether a school
district has effectively balanced its dual tasks of providing an appropriate
education72 in the least restrictive environment.2 73 However, this
comparison cannot occur unless the school district has complied with the
first factor-actually attempting to include the student in a regular
classroom and to provide supplementary aids and services as needed. 4
A court would be unable to make a fair comparison of educational
benefits if there were no evidence of how the student could function in
275
the regular classroom.
3.

What Are the Non-Academic Benefits of Inclusion That Would Be
Unavailablein a More SegregatedSetting?

Next, if applicable to the case at hand, courts may consider any nonacademic benefits the student could receive by remaining in an integrated
classroom. Assessment of the non-academic benefits of inclusion is one
of the recently developed factors; it was first mentioned in passing by the

269. See supranotes 190-97, 201-03 and accompanying text.
270. See Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1216 (3d Cir. 1993); Greer v. Rome City Sch.
Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (1lth Cir. 1991); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048
(5th Cir. 1989).
271. See supraPart I.C.-D.
272. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (1997).
273. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
274. See supra Part II.C.2.
275. See supraPartII.C.2.
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Daniel R.R. cou276 and has been subsequently echoed by other courts27
This factor recognizes that academic achievement is not the sole criterion
by which to measure success; skills like communication and social
interaction are also relevant to the analysis of proper placement.27 The
Oberti court also recognized the importance of the reciprocal benefits of
inclusion for students who do not have disabilities in the class, such as
learning how to get along with or communicate with a person with a
disability. 279
Not only has this factor been recognized and approved by several
courts, but it also fulfills Congress' intent behind the passage of the
IDEA.28 One of the main purposes of the statute was to remedy past
segregation and exclusion."8 Courts should respect Congress'
recognition of the importance of social interaction and integration of all
children by allowing non-educational benefits to tip the scales in favor of
inclusion where the educational benefits would be the same in a
segregated or integrated classroom.
4.

What PotentiallyDisruptive Impact Does the Child Have in the
Regular Classroom,Which CannotBe Remedied With
SupplementaryAids and Services?

If it is relevant to the case courts may consider any disruptive impact
the student may have on the students or the teacher in the regular
classroom. A key feature of the least restrictive environment mandate is
that students must be mainstreamed to the "maximum extent
appropriate. 28 2 Use of the word "appropriate" recognizes that full
inclusion with peers who are not disabled may not be possible for some
students because the student's behavior either disrupts the work of the
other students or causes the teacher to spend too much time addressing
those behaviors. 83 As the Department of Education's regulations state,
276. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1989).
277. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1216-17 (3d Cir. 1993); Greer v. Rome City Sch.
Dist., 950 F.2d, 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991) ("We caution, however, that 'academic achievement is not
the only purpose of mainstreaming. Integrating a handicapped child into a nonhandicapped
environment may be beneficial in and of itself."').
278. Oberti,995 F.2d at 1217; Greer, 950 F.2d at 697.
279. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
280. See supra Part I.D.
281. See supra Part I.A.
282. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(5)(A) (1997); see also supraPart I.C.
283. See 34 C.F.R. Appendix A to Part 300 (Question 39) (1999).
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the placement determination for children with behavior issues hinges on
interventions can allow the
whether behavioral strategies, supports, 2and
84
child to succeed in the regular classroom.
However, as district courts interpreting Daniel R.R. have stated," 5 it is
not sufficient for a school district to show that a student is too disruptive
to be included in a classroom; there is a threshold hurdle to overcome. 2 6
Because supplemental aids and services might result in the reduction of
the problematic behaviors, a reasonable, good-faith attempt to remedy
the behavior with aids and services must occur before a student can be
removed from the regular classroom for disruptive behavior.2" 7
Furthermore, Congress anticipated that a student's potentially
disruptive behavior problems would be addressed by the team charged
with developing the student's 1EP. 8 For children whose behavior
"impedes [their] learning or that of others," the IEP team must consider
positive behavior strategies, interventions, and supports to address the
behavior. 9 These types of strategies must be attempted before a student
can be removed to a more restrictive setting290 or subject to disciplinary
action.29' Therefore, disruptive behavior can only be considered if the
school district has attempted to provide supplementary aids and services
in the regular classroom to remedy that behavior. If the student remains
disruptive, then a court could determine that a segregated setting is
appropriate despite educational and social benefits. In such cases, once
schools have made a reasonable attempt to include the disruptive student,
courts should defer to the school district's determination that the
detriment to the teacher and other students outweighs any educational or
social benefits.
5.

The Cost of InclusionMay Be Considered if Appropriate

Next, if it is relevant, the cost of inclusion may be considered when
determining whether a district has complied with the least restrictive

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id.
See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supraPart lI.B.2
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) (1997).
Id.
S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348 (5th Cir. 1981).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B)(i) (1997).
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environment provision.292 Although not explicitly mentioned in the
IDEA, most courts agree that it may be appropriate in some situations to
consider the potentially high cost of including some students. 293 Yet this
factor also requires a preliminary threshold analysis: the Department of
Education's regulations suggest that a school district cannot plead
excessive cost of inclusion as a defense unless it first shows that it has
used its available federal funds to create a continuum of alternative
placements in the district.294 For example, the Bullitt County court noted
that schools must allocate their limited funds to provide appropriate
placements for all special education students in the district, which might
require providing expensive services at a central, more segregated
location. 295
If considered, the cost of inclusion should be accorded less weight
than other factors. The placement of children with disabilities in the least
restrictive environment is founded on equal protection principles and
Congress has made it clear that lack of funds does not remove the
obligation to provide school services in a non-discriminatory manner.296
Therefore, courts should be cautious about permitting the cost of
inclusion for a particular student to weigh in favor of a more segregated
setting. A court may only do so if the school district has made available a
continuum of appropriate placements and has fairly allocated resources
among all disabled students.
6.

Courts Should Ensure that Parents and Students Participatedin the
Placement Decision-MakingProcess

Finally, one factor that is conspicuously absent from any of the three
tests is a consideration of the role played by parents and students as
292. See supra Part I.A.1.-2.
293. See Sacramento City Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994); Greer v.
Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (l1th Cir. 1991); A.W. v. N.W. R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d
158, 164 (8th Cir. 1987); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
294. See supra Part I.A.2. See also Goldman, supra note 239, at 286 (proposing that the school
district bear the burden of proving that it they have supplied a continuum of alternative placements
before being permitted to argue that the student should be placed in a more restrictive setting).
295. See Age v. Bullitt County Sch. Dist., 673 F.2d 141, 145 (6th Cir. 1982).
296. See supra text accompanying note 33. In the Senate discussion about cost, Iowa Senator
Harkin, in addressesing Washington State Senator Gorton's concerns about the IDEA potentially
being an unfunded mandate, stated "IDEA is a civil rights statute that implements the equal
protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. IDEA helps States and local school districts pay for the
costs of implementing their constitutional obligation to disabled children." See 143 CONG. REC.
S4401-04, S4403 (1997); 143 CONG. REC. S4354-02 at S4361 (1997).
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mandatory participants in the decision-making process.2 97 The current
tests focus heavily on factors under the exclusive control of the school
district.29 To remedy this imbalance, any uniform test should include a
consideration of the family's placement preference and ability to
participate in the placement decision.
One of Congress' goals for the 1997 Amendments to IDEA was to
improve the participation of parents in the IEP process.299 A practical
way to include this goal into a test of school district compliance is to
require a showing that parent or student input was considered when
making the placement decision."' When parents challenge a school
district's ultimate placement decision, the district should be able to show
that the parents had an opportunity to participate in any IEP meetings"'
and as members of any group responsible for making placement
decisions.0 2
Furthermore, the placement location preferred by students and parents
should also be explicitly factored into the analysis. Courts should
specifically consider any countervailing evidence presented by the family
at hearings or at trial. Parents are permitted to bring an attorney and any
experts to their impartial hearing and may present evidence and
witnesses there if they wish.0 3 On appeal to a district court they may also
supplement the record with additional evidence.3' 4 Such evidence
reflecting a failure to provide supplementary aids and services or
challenging assertions regarding academic and social benefit, level of
disruption, or cost should be explicitly factored into the analysis.
297. See supraParts II.A.-C.
298. For example, finances, and teacher/aide staffing are exclusively under the control of the
school district. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401 (d), (g)(2) (1997) (stating that federal funds are allocated to
state governments, which in turn allocate the money to local educational agencies to use for special
education); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991) (stating that every facet of
school operations-faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities-is under the
local control of the school district).
299. See supra Part I.D. See generally 34 C.F.R. § 300.345 (1999) (listing the steps a school
district must take to ensure parental participation).
300. Documentation might be required to show that parents participated as members of the IEP
team or as members of any team making a placement decision. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(B), 1414(f)
(1997). Schools may also be required to show that students participated as members of their own IEP
teams if appropriate, Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(vii), or members of their transition teams. Id.
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii).
301. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
302. Id. § 1414(f).
303. 34 C.F.R. § 300.509(a)(l)-(3) (1999).
304. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(ii) (1997).
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The above five factors should guide a court's analysis of the first
prong of the framework-whether education in the regular classroom
with supplementary aids and services can be satisfactorily achieved. If,
after full consideration of those factors, a court determines that the
segregated setting would indeed be appropriate, the court must then
consider the second prong-has the student then been mainstreamed to
the maximum extent appropriate. This second prong should be relatively
straightforward, asking courts to assess whether the student can be
integrated for activities like recess, lunch, gym, or art and music classes.
This model test in its entirety incorporates both current jurisprudence and
Congressional intent behind the 1997 Amendments. The consolidated
test emphasizes aids and services to improve students' access to the
regular curriculum and includes input from parents in the analysis.
III. CONCLUSION
In an attempt to fill the void left by the Supreme Court's lack of
guidance on the LRE provision, the circuit courts have developed several
tests that have been used to determine compliance with that part of the
IDEA. District courts have further refined those tests. The proposed
synthesis of the tests that capitalizes on their strengths, using a two-prong
framework and employing a list of relevant factors derived from
statutory language. This proposed test should be adopted to avoid the
disparate enforcement of the LRE provision across the country.
Courts should also be required to consider whether parents and
students had an opportunity to participate in the placement decisionmaking process. If so, their preference for placement should be explicitly
taken into account. Congress intended to strengthen the role of parents
and students, and their participation should be included among the other
relevant factors used to determine compliance with the LRE requirement.

